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URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EMERGENT 
CITIZENS' RIGHTS FOR THE AESTHETIC, T H E  
SPIRITUAL, AND T H E  SPACIOUS? 
Nicholas A. Robinson* 
I. Introduction 
The issues in environmental law which have been championed in 
recent years by conservationists, ecologists, lawyers, and legislators 
have been largely directed toward the natural environment. How- 
ever, very recently and with growing force, new la& has been chan- 
neled into the service of our nation's urban centers as well as its 
wilderness. The need to redress urban ills has been widely appre- 
ciated, but the gap between intellectual awareness and responsive 
action has remained substantial. 
The now traditional responses to urban problems have involved 
the creation of zoning laws,' public housing pr~grarns ,~  and urban , 
r e n e ~ a l . ~  While these laws have given rise to a host of litigations 
involving property rights4 and personal l iber t ie~,~ little attention 
had been given to the vindication of individual citizen rights to a 
healthy urban environment. The emphasis has been on broad 
schemes to redress urban ills, not on self-enforceable  right^.^ 
t Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (Douglas, J.). 
* A.B. Brown University; J.D. Columbia University School of Law. Mr. Robinson is a 
member of the New York Bar, and is associated with Marshall, Bratter, Greene, Allison & 
Tucker, New York, New York. 
1. The constitutional validity of reasonable local zoning regulations was upheld in Village 
of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The reasonableness of a regulation varies 
with individual "circumstances and conditions." Id. a t  387. 
2. 42 U.S.C. $ 4  1401-35 (1970). 
3. The National Housing Act of 1949 provided for slum clearance projects, in which slum 
areas were cleared and then redeveloped for new uses. In 1953, a Presidential Advisory 
Committee on housing policies recommended the extension of the slum clearance program 
to include neighborhood conservation and rehabilitation. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM. ON 
GOV'T HOUSING POLICIES & PROGRAMS, A REPORT O THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
115 (1953). The term "urban renewal" was coined for the new program, and the 1954 federal 
statute reflects these changes. For the definition of "urban renewal project," see 42 U.S.C. Q 
1460(c) (1970). See generally, Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Requirement In 
Urban Renewal, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1967). 
4. See R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 4 2.19 (1968). 
5. See 1 CCH POVERTY L. REP. 77 2855, 2860 (1972). 
6. See generally 0. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1963). 
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The last few years, however, have heralded a change in this pat- 
tern. The development of personally held and asserted citizen rights 
to a quality urban environment can be traced to two developments. 
The first development was the gradual expansion of standing to sue. 
This expansion in the federal courts was the result of claims pressed 
by environmentalists,' and other public l i t igankR In state courts, 
the broader standing followed the federal trend either by statute9 or 
by case law.lo 
The second development was the increasing public concern for 
maintaining and restoring the quality of the environment. Local 
legislators responded to this concern by adopting new laws for main- 
taining open space, protecting parks, preserving historic monu- 
ments, averting litter, eliminating noise, and requiring air pollution 
abatement. 
Simultaneously, federal and state laws for environmental protec- 
tion evolved, and added to the substantive law structuring govern- 
ment and citizen rights in the cities. Most prominent among these 
laws was the National Environmental Protection Act" (NEPA) and 
the equivalent environmental assessment laws enacted in two- 
thirds of the states.12 
7. See, e.g. ,  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson 
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal 
Power Comm., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 
U.S. 669 (1972). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (interests of consumers affected by decision of Secretary of Agriculture 
refusing to suspend registration of certain pesticides containing DDT); Reade v. Ewing, 205 
F.2d 630, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1953) (interests of consumers of oleomargarine in fair labeling of 
product regulated by Federal Security Administration). 
9. See, e.g., The Thomas J .  Anderson-Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 
1970, 127 MICH COMP. L. ANN. $ 8  691.1201-.I207 (Supp. 1975). 
10. Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830 
(1974). But see Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth., 48 App. Div. 2d 69, 368 N.Y.S.2d 
165 (1st Dep't 1975) (parents' group denied opportunity to challenge excessive subway noise 
near school for lack of standing to press public rights). See Robinson, Groping Toward Stand- 
ing To Sue, 174 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Jan. 27, 1976). 
11. 42 U.S.C. 86  4321-47 (1970). 
12. See, e.g., New York Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), N.Y. ENVIRONMEN- 
TAL CONSERVATION LAW 4 8  8-010 to -0115 (McKinney Supp. 1975); Tryzna, A Comparative 
Review of State Environmental Impact Laws Within a Federal System, 1 EARTH L.J. 133 
(1975). At the municipal level, New York City has enacted its own environmental impact 
analysis. New York, N.Y. Executive Order No. 87 (October 18, 1973). This order requires 
environmental review for "major projects" such as the construction of a new building with 
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Recently citizens finding these new environmental laws ignored 
by government agencies have sued to enforce them, and have called 
upon courts to fashion decrees and to require that legislative man- 
dates be implemented, not subverted. The day has arrived when a 
citizen's right to a healthy urban setting should command as much 
attention as the safeguarding of natural areas13 or wildlife.I4 Indeed, 
urban environmental law has emerged as a subcategory within the 
field of environmental law itself.I5 
While articles on the urban environment often deal with statutory 
and administrative action, this article presents a different perspec- 
tive, that of citizen enforcement and the judicial. consequences of 
such a development. Illustrative of the emergent role of courts in 
enforcing citizens' claims are the areas of historic preservation, 
noise regulation, and the use of environmental impact statements. 
11. Historic Preservation 
When the Supreme Court recognized "aesthetic considerations" 
as a significant element of the public welfare, it provided a potential 
litigant with an argument that aesthetics, and, specifically, histori- 
cally preserved sites, are necessarily part of one's right to a sound 
environment. Indeed, since the constitutionality of historic 
preservation has been firmly established, a "burgeoning awareness 
that our heritage and culture are treasured national assets . . . "10 
has evolved. A brief description of preservation laws and their gene- 
sis usefully sets the stage for a discussion of a citizen's suit to enforce 
such rights. 
A. Federal Legislation 
Although the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu- 
tional propriety of the government's power to preserve landmarks as 
long ago as 1896," it was not until after World War I that the 
more than twenty floors, new residential buildings with forty-two or more dwelling units, or 
designation of right-of-way for an expressway. 
13. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion). 
14. Udall v. Federal Power Comm., 387 U.S. 428 (1967). 
15. For a discussion of the origins and definition of Environmental Law, see Robinson, 
Methods and Framework of Environmental Law in the United States, 1 EARTH L.J. 323 
(1975). 
16. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 174 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1st Dep't Dec. 18, 
1975). 
17. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). 
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government began inventorying its historic property and enacting 
preservation laws. Skilled manpower available in the 1930s pro- 
duced the Historic American Buildings Survey which had cata- 
logued some 12,000 buildings by 1933. In 1935, Congress enacted an 
Historic Sites Act.IR However, the pace of urban change quickened 
and one building after another was replaced. 
In the face of rapid razing of historical buildings or areas, Con- 
gress established the National Trust for Historic Preservation in 
1938 to encourage state and local preservation.I8 The use of special- 
ized local zoning legislation has developed in communities across 
the nation.20 TO such local laws have been added some federal enact- 
ments, most of them with little or no teeth. Chief among these are 
the Historic Preservation Act of 1966,21 the historic protection sec- 
tions of the Housing Acts of 1961 and 1965,22 and the Department 
of Transportation Act of 1966.23 These federal laws set historic pres- 
ervation as a government responsibility. The 1966 Historic Preser- 
vation Act authorizes a National Register of Historic Places con- 
taining landmarks nominated by state governments, provides for 
grants in aid, and requires that the agency involved in any federal 
action affecting a registered landmark must "take into account the 
effect" of the action and "afford the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation . . . a reasonable opportunity to comment" on such 
effect.24 
More forceful is the Transportation Act, which mandates that no 
historic site can be used unless there is "no feasible and prudent 
alternative" and "all possible planning to minimize harm" has been 
accomplished.2s The section has been construed to bar any resort to 
historic sites for highway use, and has been used by urban dwellers 
to save urban park lands.20 
The Housing Acts encourage historic preservation but lack the 
prohibitive bars of the highway legislation. The 1966 Demonstration 
Cities and Metropolitan Development Act provides funds for local 
18. Act of Aug. 1, 1935, ch. 593, 49 Stat. 666 (codified at 16 U.S.C. $ 9  461-70 (1070)). 
19. Act of Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 755, 63 Stat. 927 (codified at 16 U.S.C. $ 5  468-68e (1970)). 
20. See R. ANDERSON, EW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 5 5  8.46-8.53 (2d ed. 1973). 
21. 16 U.S.C. 4 470 (1970). 
22. 42 U.S.C. 5  1500d-1 (1970). 
23. 49 U.S.C. $0 1651-59 (1970). 
24. 16 U.S.C. 5  470(f) (1970). 
25. 49 U.S.C. 5  1653(f) (1970). 
26. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.  402 (1971). 
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surveys of historic sites,27 and has provided grants for urban beauti- 
fication and open space. But the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) has been criticized for functioning "with ap- 
parent indifference to the destruction of historic sites . . . whenever 
local development authorities are prepared to sacrifice those proper- 
ties in the interests of urban renewal or other housing  program^."^^ 
Essentially, then, historic preservation in the man-made environ- 
ment can expect little except aid and comfort from administrative 
federal sources. Commitment and action necessarily occurs a t  the 
state and local level. 
B. New York Legislation 
In an urban context, preservation laws are singularly directed to 
the unique and historically significant architecture of a city. The 
New York City legislation is, in essence, urban land use regulation 
for preserving a key component of environmental quality. Historic 
preservation laws, however, tend not to be as encompassing or as 
stringent as laws developed to protect the natural envir~nrnent .~~ 
This is somewhat anomalous for certainly there is a strong rationale 
for enacting comprehensive historic preservation laws locally. More- 
over, historic preservation, unlike some natural area preservation 
often involves economic benefits which help minimize the due pro- 
cess problems of such legi~la t ion.~~ 
New York City's Landmark Preservation Law was first enacted 
in 1965. Adopted pursuant to state enabling legi~lation,~' the local 
law recognized that the protection of historic buildings and districts 
enhances the city's aesthetic, economic, cultural and educational 
values. Historic preservation can stabilize property values and ad- 
vance civic pride and r e p u t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Without the Landmark Preserva- 
27. 16 U.S.C. 5 462 (1970). 
28. Gray, The Response of Federal Legislation to Historic Preseoation, 36 LAW & CON- 
TEMP. PROB. 314, 325 (1971). 
29. N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW art. 25 (McKinney Supp. 1975); Robinson, 
N. Y. Land Use: Legislature Bans Development On Wetlands, 174 N.Y.L.J. 6 (July 25, 1973). 
30. See Note, Land Use Controls in Historical Areas, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 379, 387-88 
(1969). 
31. Law of April 19, 1965, No. 46, [I9651 N.Y. Local Laws 261 (codified a t  NEW YORK, 
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, 85 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1975)) [hereinafter cited as Land- 
marks Act]. The Act was passed under the New York Historic Preservation Enabling Act of 
1956. Law of April 2, 1956, ch. 216, [I9561 N.Y. Laws 246 (now N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW !j 96- 
a (McKinney Supp. 1975)). 
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tion Law, this heritage was bereft of any legal safeguard. 
While some of the preservation techniques have not been tested 
in the courts, the statute has weathered and survived attacks on its 
con~titutionality.~~ The Landmark Commission's authority is more 
directed and explicit than the powers exercised by other city agen- 
cies under the Zoning Resolution. Any site, building or other struc- 
ture or area of the city with special character can be designated as 
a landmark34 after approval by the Board of Estimate. Staff reports 
are prepared on all proposed landmarks, whereupon a public hear- 
ing is held,35 and the Commission renders a final report and deci- 
sion. 
Any alteration to a designated landmark requires application to 
the Commis~ion ,~~  which then examines whether the proposed act 
is consistent with the landmark's architectural miena3' Public hear- 
ings are provided, but informal consultations on changes are encour- 
aged so that, through conferences, an agreed course of action may 
be achieved. The Preservation Law includes enforcement provisions 
and criminal sanctions for altering or demolishing a landmark with- 
out permission of the Commission. Fines and imprisonment are 
provided for as ultimate sanctions.3R 
This sort of regulatory scheme is the administrative answer to 
private suits grounded in aesthetic nuisance theories.38 While pri- 
vate suits are a costly and imprecise tool, the landmark designation 
process is not. It permits a sophisticated balancing of interests 
within a mandate to preserve the historic, architectural milieu. 
As historic preservation laws are strengthened, their relationship 
32. The purposes of the Landmarks Act as  set out in 205-l.O(b) are to  strengthen the 
economy of the city, and promote the use of historic districts for the education, pleasure, and 
welfare of the city's residents. 
33. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121,'316 N.E.2d 305, 
359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 53 Misc. 2d 933, 280 
N.Y.S.2d 75 (Sup. Ct. 19671, reo'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dep't 1968); 
Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n., 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 
(Sup. Ct. 1966). 
34. Landmarks Act 5 207-l.O(k). 
35. Id. 8 207-12.O(.b). 
36. Id. 5 207-3.0. 
37. Id. 5 207-8.0(G)(2). 
38. Id. 5 207-16.0. 
39. Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL . Q. 1 (1939); Note, Aesthetic 
Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1970). 
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to other regulation of the human environment must be considered. 
While historic preservation was one of the earliest instances of 
"amenity" legislation, it is increasingly recognized as an integral 
component of the environmental lawyer's tools. Recently, citizens 
have invoked New York City's Landmark Preservation Law to serve 
their urban aesthetic goals. 
Thus far most private suits in the preservation area have been 
brought against the Landmark Commission by owners of landmark 
property not realizing a sufficient return. If the plaintiff in such a 
case proves an unreasonable economic burden in maintaining the 
landmark status, the Act places upon the Commission the burden 
of devising a plan whereby the landmark may be preserved and 
rendered "capable of earning a reasonable return."40 The thrust and 
focus of the Act is to empower the Commission to act on its own 
initiative in preserving the city's architecture. 
On the other hand, when the relevant agency fails to designate or 
protect the landmark, citizens may bring an administrative law 
proceeding which is more manageable than a plenary suit a t  Com- 
mon Law. Indeed, it is in this area that citizen suits on behalf of 
landmark property have been most appropriate and most frequent. 
In Neighborhood Association to Preserve Fifth Avenue Houses, 
Inc. v .  Spatt4' a property owners association and other plaintiffs 
challenged the denial by the Landmarks Preservation Commission 
of their application to designate East 82nd Street between Fifth and 
Madison Avenues in Manhattan an historic district. 
Although the Commission had held hearings regarding designa- 
tion on a house by house basis, it had denied the block "district" 
landmark status without holding a public hearing which would have 
given the Association an opportunity to present its views. In defend- 
ing its action, the Commission relied on its exercise of discretion and 
cited insufficient public interest in the application. When the Com- 
mission moved to dismiss the Association's Article 78 proceeding, 
the court denied its motion, holding that:42 
40. Landmarks Act 4 207-l.O(c). A valuation of the "reasonable return" shall be "the 
current assessed valuation established by the city, which is in effect at the time of the filing 
of the request for a certificate of appropriateness . . . ." Id. 4 207-1.0(q)(2). 
41. 174 N.Y.L.J. 7 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 1975). 
42. Id. 
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There is demonstrated interest on the part of a group which is directly con- 
cerned with the future of this area and its role in conveying an image of this 
city and in preserving a part of its past for the citizens of the future. This is 
a group, varied in makeup, which has performed a substantial feat at great 
expense in time and effort in documenting and publishing the history of the 
area in question and in obtaining the support of civic and community leaders 
in aid of its goal. There is no question that the issue raised is one of public 
interest . . . . 
The vigor of such citizen enforcement is also shown in a matter 
which has as yet avoided a court test, the effort to preserve the 
Villard Houses in Manhattan. These late 19th century mansions, 
which are located immediately behind St. Patrick's Cathedral have 
a unique role in the City's history and current a t rn~sphe re .~~  They 
were designated as landmark exteriors by the Commission in 1965.44 
The Commission failed to designate the gilded music room or "Gold 
Room" of the Whitelaw-Reid Wing of the Villard Houses as an 
interior landmark despite its status as the only example of such 
architecture in the City. 
A developer, the New York Palace Hotel, appeared with a pro- 
posal to tear down the back half of the Villard Houses, including the 
Gold Room, in order to erect a hotel. The local Conlmunity Plan- 
ning Board opposed the move,45 but the developer persisted and 
filed its application for a variance with the Board of Standards and 
Appeals for the City of New Y ~ r k , ~ ~  the City's zoning appeals board. 
At  this point the New York Landmarks Conservancy, a not-for- 
profit. corporation dedicated to the preservation and wise use of 
landmarks, intervened in the variance proceedings. Although the 
site of the Villard Houses is located near both the Special Fifth 
Avenue and Madison Avenue Districts, it is located in neither one. 
Nonetheless, the Conservancy invoked a provision of the city Zoning 
Resolution giving the City Planning Commission rather than the 
43. The Villard Houses were designed by McKim, Meade & White, Architects, patterned 
after the Roman Palazzo Delle Chancelleria, at the request of Henry Villard, in 1883. Their 
history and value have been frequently noted, Ellis, Very Special Place For Special Peo- 
ple-Church Publisher Neighbors, N.Y. World Telegram, July 1, 1960, at 15, col. 3; Huxtable, 
They Call this 'Saving' a Landmark?, N.Y. Times, Jan 5, 1975, at D29, col. 1. 
44. Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of New York, Certificate of Appro- 
priateness No. 364, Henry Villard Houses. 
45. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1975, at 35, col. 1. 
46. Application for Variance on Behalf of the Archbishopric of New York, No. 693-74-BZ 
(Bd. of Standards and Appeals of the City of N.Y., filed Nov. 26, 1974). 
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Board of Standards and Appeals jurisdiction over lots containing 
areas equivalent to that proposed for the The developer then 
withdrew its variance application and entered into negotiations 
with the Conservancy and the City Planning Commission to explore 
a compromise. To date, the City Planning Commission has not yet 
acted. 
Thus, where the Landmarks Commission has failed to protect 
historic areas, as in the Fifth Avenue case, or has not protected the 
resource sufficiently, as was the case with the Gold Room of the 
Villard Houses, citizens have readily stepped in. While historic 
preservation legislation was not designed to encourage citizen par- 
ticipation, it permits contributions from the public either in the 
form of judicial challenge or through independent action. 
111. Noise Abatement 
The last five years have produced extensive new laws a t  the local, 
state and federal levels to regulate noise and create causes of action 
for noise related injury,4s and even to impose criminal sanctions for 
excessive noise.4g These recent statutes and ordinances were 
adopted against the background of long standing common law reme- 
dies which had ceased to be sufficiently e f f e~ t ive .~~  They represent 
an attempt to combat a pervasive hazard more effectively than was 
possible under common law. In the wake of these trends a new area 
of urban environmental law has emerged. 
47. New York, N.Y. Zoning Resolution 8 74-72. 
48. As of 1972, there were between 1,500 and 2,000 state and local noise control codes. 61 
AM. JUR. 2d Pollution Control § 111 (1972). On the local level, see CHICAGO,YLL., MUNICIPAL 
CODE § 17-1.6 to -4.21 (1970), discussed in Grad & Hack, Noise Control in the Urban 
Environment, 1972 URBAN LAW ANNUAL 3,14 (1972). That statute requires that manufacturers 
who sell specified vehicles and other equipment in Chicago to certify that their equipment 
meets prescribed noise emission standards. On the state level, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 8 
403.061(13) (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE 23-01-17 (Supp. 1975), which authorize the air and 
water pollution control agencies of their respective states to establish noise standards. 
49. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1403.3-1.01 to -8.25 (1975). 
50. See generally. Comment, The New York City Noise Control Code: Not With a Bang 
But With A Whisper, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 446, 447-51 (1973). Until the enactment of the 
New York City Noise Code in 1972, local citizens had only partial success in enforcing existing 
noise laws due in large part to the lack of established measureable standards to judge noise 
pollution. The police department has always had the right to enforce laws against noise 
polluters but such actions were a low priority problem for the department. Mayor Lindsay 
appointed a task force to study the problem of noise in New York City and the group's report 
helped spark passage of the 1972 Code. Id. a t  449. 
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When the harmful effects of noise were little understood, the nuis- 
ance doctrine afforded uneven protection. Nuisance or trespass 
theories often result in a balancing of equities with a judgment not 
wholly satisfactory to either party. Damages may be awarded; and 
in cases where a governmental agency produces the noise, courts 
have held that there has been a confiscation of property  right^.^' 
Yet, money awards alone do not remedy the problem. While nuis- 
ance actions can result in injunctive relief removing the noise, they 
can also result in money damages alone without the equitable relief 
primarily Rather than leave the aggrieved citizen to com- 
mon law remedies, statutes were enacted to provide private enforce- 
ment of the right to eliminate unwanted noise. 
At the federal level, noise laws have vastly expanded both envi- 
ronmental rights and their enforcement. Federal noise laws regulate 
noise levels in places of employment. They also regulate aviation 
noise and noise levels in machinery sold in interstate commerce. 
While the occupational noise standards are promulgated under 
OSHA,53 and the Federal Aviation Authority sets noise emission 
standards from aircraft,54 it is in the regulation of machinery noise 
levels where the greatest latitude is provided for citizen enforce- 
ment. Indeed, it is the area of broadest prohibition and the relevant 
statute, the Noise Control Act of 1972,55 specifically provides for 
citizen suits. 
51. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). In Causby, the Court said that  the 
fifth amendment of the Constitution required the Federal Government to  pay for air- 
space taken from a private citizen and rejected the landowner's common law argument that 
ownership of the land extended to the periphery. Id. a t  260-61. See also Griggs v. Allegheny 
Co., 369 U.S. 84 (1962). For a case involving a state statute, see Aaron v. Los Angeles, 40 
Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974). 
52. This is particularly true in government air space confiscation cases. See Town of East 
Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 333 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1971). 
53. 29 U.S.C. $6 651-78 (1970). See also 29 C.F.R. 8 1910.95, Table G-16 (1975). Sample 
permissible sound levels include 6 hours a t  92 decibels, 4 hours a t  95 decibels, 1 hour a t  105 
decibels, and l/r hour or less a t  115 decibels. Id. 
54. The Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. $ 4906 (Supp. IV, 1974), 49 U.S.C. $ 1431 
(Supp. N, 1974). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must consult with the Environ- 
mental Protection Administration (EPA) before prescribing and recommending standards. 
The EPA must then submit the proposed regulations to the FAA. The FAA may accept, 
modify or reject the EPA proposals. If it does modify or reject, the EPA may request a review. 
49 U.S.C. $ 6  1431 (c)(1),(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
55. 42 U.S.C. B $  4901-18 (Supp. IV, 1974), 49 U.S.C. $ 1431 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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A. The Noise Control Act of 1972 
In 1970, the Noise Pollution and Abatement ActSB was enacted to 
promote research into all aspects of noise. In addition, where the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator de- 
termined that a federal agency's acts  created unwanted noise, the 
Act required that agency to consult with the EPA concerning abate- 
ment.57 
In 1972, Congress concluded that noise problems created by vehi- 
cles, construction equipment and other machinery used in interstate 
commerce ought to be regulated uniformly. Pursuant to that deci- 
sion it enacted the Noise Control Act of 1972,58 which sets noise 
emission standards for such products in interstate commerce58 other 
than aircraft and military items.60 "Environmental Noise" is 
broadly defined as the "intensity, duration and the character of 
sounds from all  source^."^' The Act requires the EPA Administrator 
to set criteria for identifying different noise qualities and quantities 
and their impact on public health.62 He must then set noise emission 
standards for major sources of noise, after considering the economic 
possibilities of noise reduction. The manufacturer must warrant 
that its product will conform to the federal emission standards at  
the time of sale.63 Thus, warranty is for manufacturing defects only. 
The user is responsible for using the product in its normal way with 
normal m a i n t e n a n ~ e . ~ ~  I 
The Act's thrust is toward manufacturers but users may be sub- 
ject to more stringent local laws depending on the circumstances. 
Thus, the Act allows more specific local laws, such as New York 
City's Noise Code, to continue in force, except where they deal with 
56. 42 U.S.C. 8  1858 (1970). 
57. Id. 5 1858(c). When compiling their NEPA impact statements, see 42 U.S.C. $ 4332 
(19701, the heads of all federal agencies should ensure that all facilities under their jurisdic- 
tion are designed, constructed, managed, operated and maintained to conform to the Stan- 
dard of the Noise Control Act of 1972. Exec. Order No. 11,752, 3 C.F.R. 380-85 (1974). 
58. 42 U.S.C. $ 8  4901-18 (Supp. IV, 1974), 49 U.S.C. 5  1431 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
59. 42 U.S.C. 5  4905 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
60. For aircraft regulations, see 42 U.S.C. 8  4906 (Supp. IV, 1974); 49 U.S.C. 5 1431 
(Supp. IV, 1974). 
61. 42 U.S.C. 8  4902(11) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
62. Id. 5  4904(a). 
63. Id. 5  4905(d)(l). 
64. S.  REP. NO. 1160, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972). 
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the design-related noise emission of m a ~ h i n e r y . ~ ~  
The enforcement provisions of the Act are similar to those of the 
Clean Air ActaR and include both fines and imprisonment as penal- 
ties. First offender violators may be fined up to $25,000 or impris- 
oned for one year, and any violator may be subject to an injunc- 
t i ~ n . " ~  Most significantly, the Act creates a civil cause of action for 
"any person" to restrain any other person, including a governmental 
agency, from violating a federal noise standard or to require enforce- 
ment of such a standard. The Court may award the costs of litiga- 
tion including reasonable attorney and witness fees;a9 such a provi- 
sion substantially undercuts the discouraging cost factor of citizen 
suit litigation. Moreover nothing restricts the individual's right to 
sue under common law or any other ~ta tute .7~ Before a citizen sues 
a federal or state governmental agency to enforce noise rights, he 
must first give sixty days notice of intent to sue,71 and the notice 
must recite the nature of the alleged violation. Since these citizen 
suit and notice provisions have only recently become effective, there 
is not sufficient data for analysis. 
B .  New York City Noise Code 
Illustrative of local legislation is the New York City Noise Code72 
which provides for citizen enforcement of its provisions and actively 
relies on citizen protests and reports. New York's Noise Control 
Code of 1972 is a model of vigorous legislation intended to remedy 
the absence of noise regulation. The Code codifies the common law 
ban on "unnecessary noise"73 and specifically defines "prohibitive 
noise"74 from vehicle exhausts and other sources. The Code contem- 
plates the setting of noise levels for aircraft, railroads, subways, 
65. 42 U.S.C. $ 5  4905(e)(l)(A),(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
66. Compare id. § 4910 with Clean Air Act, id. 8 1857(c-8)(c) (1970). 
67. Id. 5 4901 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
68. The EPA may intervene in such actions. Id. 5 4911(c). 
69. Id. 5 4911(d). 
70. Id. 5 4911(e). These provisions substantially duplicate the federal citizen suit authori- 
zations of the Clean Air Act, id. 5 1857(h-2) (1970) and the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C. 1365 (Supp. IV, 1974). 
71. 39 Fed. Reg. 36011 (1974). 
72. NEW YORK. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE 5 5  1403.3-1.01 to -8.25 (1975). 
73. Id. 5 1403.3-1.03 (1975). 
74. Id. 5 1403.3-3.01. 
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trucks, and various other noise producing systems.75 
Enforcement of the Code is through complaints to the New York 
City Environmental Control Board, and administrative court. The 
Board may issue subpoenas, order the installation of noise control 
equipment, issue cease and desist orders, impose civil penalties up 
to $1,000 per day, and revoke permits or  variance^.^^ 
Any citizen may initiate enforcement proceedings and the City 
Department of Air Resources provides a kit with forms for filing a 
formal "Citizens Noise Complaint Affidavit" and offers a bounty of 
25 percent of any fine assessed to the complainant. While citizen 
complaints give the aggrieved individual an outlet for prosecution 
of noise violators, the Environmental Control Board docket is so 
crowded and its follow-up so limited that real relief may not be 
immediately forthcoming. Still, the force of eventual fines has pro- 
vided incentive for noise abatement, as well as the possibility of 
private suits alleging damages. Furthermore, the Code has created 
standards of illegality which may be treated as nuisances per se by 
plaintiffs. 
C. Problems in Noise Control Litigation 
While noise control has become an integral aspect of environmen- 
tal quality, the battle toward reaching the various statutes' objec- 
tives will not be without problems. Noise laws, like other urban 
environmental laws, do not easily mesh with other older urban val- 
ues and vested interests. The trade-off issues presented are an in- 
structive example of conflicts along the way to a noise-free city. 
The problem of harmonizing environmental laws with other poli- 
cies is well illustrated by New York Telephone Co. u. New York City 
Transportation Adrn in i~ t r a t i on .~~  In this suit against New York 
City, New York Telephone Empire City Subway Co., Ltd., Consoli- 
dated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., and the Brooklyn Union Gas 
Co. attacked amendments to the City Department of Highways 
Rules regulating street openings.78 One of the amendments prohib- 
75. Id. $ 6  1403.3-4.01 to -4.23, -5.01 to -5.23. 
76. The section of the Code dealing with the functioning of the Environment,al Control 
Board is NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE 5 1403.3-8.01 (1975). There is also a section in the 
Code dealing with citizen complaints. Id. 5 1403.3-8.09. 
77. 44 App. Div. 2d 784, 355 N.Y.S.  2d 6 (1st Dep't 1974). 
78. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE 9 1403.3-4.11 (1975). 
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ited any work on subsurface installations in eighty-one named 
streets on weekdays between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. (daylight), with 
exceptions provided for inspection and emergency work. The Com- 
mission of Highways may declare an emergency upon application if 
interruption of a public utility or sanitation service might result 
from having to postpone a street opening to a weekend. In "undue 
hardship" cases the Commissioner may waive or modify the regula- 
tions to accommodate specific cases. 
The City adopted these rules pursuant to the transportation con- 
trols required by the Federal Clean Air Act and the New York State 
approved "New York City Metropolitan Area Air Quality Imple- 
mentation Plan Transportation  control^,"^^ a plan approved by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agen~y.~" The City, con- 
sidering itself bound by the state and federal law requiring transpor- 
tation controls, asserted that its discretion had been preempted and 
that such street opening rules were mandated. Plaintiffs argued that 
the Department of Highways rules were unrelated to the Plan, and, 
further, that the "daylight" rule is an abuse of the City's police 
power in that it conflicts with, and seriously impairs, the New York 
State mandate to utilities to provide certain public services without 
interr~ption.~ '  Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that the Rule conflicted 
with the City's Noise Control Code.R2 That Code bans construction 
on weekends and on weekdays between 6 p.m. and 7 a.m. (night) 
under city permit.R3 Variances for "public safety" reasons may be 
granted by any City agency,R4 although, in emergencies, none are 
required for a twelve hour period. 
The Supreme Court of New York County granted the utility 
plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against the Department of High- 
79. This latter report was issued by the New York State Dept. of Environmental Conser- 
,vation in April 1973. 44 App. Div. 2d a t  785-86, 355 N.Y.S. 2d a t  7-8. 
80. See note 157 infra. 
81. See, e .g . ,  N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW $ 5  65, 91 (McKinney 1955); N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW 
$5 11, 27 (McKinney 1943). The Public Service Commission appeared as  amicus curiae on 
behalf of the utilities initially and on appeal. New York Tel. Co. v. New York City Transp. 
Admin., 44 App. Div. 2d 784, 355 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1st Dep't 1974). 
82. NEW YORK. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE 5 1403.3-4.11(a) (1975) which allows construction only 
on weekdays between the hours of 7 A.M. and 6 P.M. 
83. Id. 8 1403.3-4.11. 
84.  Id. 5 1403.3-4.11(b). 
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ways Rules on street openings while denying a motion to dismiss. 
The utilities had successfully contended that they could not fulfill 
their normal maintenance work and abide by the amended rules. 
The Appellate Division for the First Department affirmedus but 
declined to take judicial notice or (impliedly) to consider the federal 
preemption issues since the plan for transportation controls was not 
a part of the record 
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Kupferman observed that 
the utilities' attack was on the Highway Rules rather than on the 
Noise Code: "They are not generally desirous of having night time 
work due to union problems and overtime pay, muggings, [and] 
not finding nearby customers open . . . . "uu 
Most significant for the purpose of this discussion, however, is the 
recognition which Judge Kupferman gave to the public policy trade- 
~ f f ~ : ~ ~  
Obviously, the legislative and executive branches have an obligation to help 
prevent air polution and noise pollution and yet also .to allow the utilities 
promptly to perform their duties. Where there is a possible conflict in the 
achievement of these ends, the court should not intervene unless the resolu- 
tion of the conflict is arbitrary and unreasonable . . . . Although yet to be 
demonstrated, it may be that the utilities involved will have additional ex- 
penses, but this is part of the social cost of having a more livable environment 
. . . . The danger inherent in having uninspected utility facilities, such as 
gas lines, is readily apparent, and the problem requires careful consideration, 
but in proper perspective. 
What Judge Kupferman views as a "proper perspective" is both 
perspicacious and time-tested. As Chief Judge Breitel has written 
with respect to New York City's local law regulating emissions from 
.fuel burners and refuse incinerators, resolution of thorny regulatory 
problems can proceed even by trial and error, The justification for 
such experimental efforts is the fact that "[u]nfortunately, the 
extent of the pollution problem, its life-threatening acceleration, 
and the high economic and social costs of control are exceeded in 
gravity by only one or two other domestic or even international 
85. 44 App. Div. 2d at 784, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 7. 
86. Id.  
87. Id.  at 785, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 8. 
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 786, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9. 
90. Oriental Boulevard Co. v.  Heller, 27 N.Y .2d 212,219,265 N.E.2d 72,75,316 N.Y .S.2d 
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While the curb on certain weekday street openings would reduce 
traffic congestion and thereby aid commerce as well as curb air 
pollution, it is true that some new costs would accrue to the utili- 
ties." These, in turn, are likely to be passed on to the rate-paying 
public. The real question is whether they should be allowed to so 
tax the public since, it is the "right of the public to the use of the 
streets which is 'absolute and paramount.' " Private abutters have 
no such right.B2 A franchised utility's interest in streets is arguably 
no less subservient to the public's right of use. 
Regretfully, a considered balancing of these issues was delayed 
when trial was postponed. The public was the loser in not having a 
prompt adjudication of these issues. The Highway Department con- 
templated permit-by-permit evaluation of trade-offs for street open- 
ings. Its rules were consistent with the Clean Air Act.93 Moreover, a 
Noise Code variance could be given for the "urgent necessity" of 
reducing air pollution and traffic conge~t ion .~~  Since a compatible 
statutory interpretation was possible, the utilities might have 
served the public better by working under the rules rather than 
seeking their invalidation in limine. Ultimately, the trade-off issue 
here is one for .administrative action and legislative amelioration 
and refinement in light of practice. Courts can proceed only so far. 
"So long as there is reasonable basis in available information, and 
rationality in chosen courses of conduct to alleviate an accepted 
evil, there is no constitutional infirm it^."^^ 
IV. NEPA and the City 
The requirements for environmental impact statements have ad- 
vanced the ability of a citizen to protect himself from unanticipated 
environmental harm a t  the hands of federal agencies. The urban 
226, 230 (1970). 
91. Such increased costs would accrue in the form of overtime pay for employees, union 
problems, and increased security for workers. App. Div. 2d a t  785, 355 N.Y.S.2d a t  8. 
92. Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 110, 115, 154 N.E.2d 814, 816, 
180 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (1958). 
93. See Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 356 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (N.Y.C. can 
control amount of lead in gasoline sold within city); Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 
340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (ordinance regulation exhaust emission controls for li- 
censed cabs found not to be pre-empted). 
94. NEW YORK. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE 8 1403.3-4.11(b) (1975). 
95. Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 27 N.Y.2d 212, 219,265 N.E.2d 72,75, 316 N.Y.S.2d 
226, 230 (1970). 
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NEPA cases reached important new dimensions in recent years. A 
review of the cases in and around New York evidences how 
important and open-ended the analysis of environmental impact 
has become today. The vindication of rights for an urban com- 
munity "beautiful as well as healthywg6 has been made more realis- 
tic than ever before. 
A. Chelsea Case 
In Chelsea Neighborhood Association v. United States Postal 
. 
Service the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
ruled that the U.S. Postal Service had not properly adhered to the 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) in proposing con- 
struction of a Vehicle Maintenance Facility (VMF) in the Chelsea 
neighborhood of Manhattan.97 Judge Ward's opinion was affirmed 
by the Second Circuit Court of  appeal^.^^ 
Prior to the Chelsea case NEPA had been invoked in a series of 
challenges to the new Federal House of Detention being built behind 
the U.S. Courthouse in Foley Square.gg In Hanly v .  Kleindien~t '"~ 
the Second Circuit required strict adherence to NEPA's purposes 
and procedures, but on the facts, no serious environmental adverse 
impact was present in the proposed new detention center."" The 
Chelsea case is a more sophisticated and meritorious instance of 
NEPA's utility. 
The Postal Service's VMF clearly raised serious environmental 
health and safety issues. The Postal Service had prepared an Envi- 
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS); but when neighborhood resi- 
dents challenged the sufficiency of the EIS, the Service contended 
that it was not required to comply with NEPA.In2 The district court 
disagreed, and in a ruling of first impression held the Postal Service 
subject to NEPA. 
96. Berman v .  Parker, 348 U.S.  26, 33 (1954). 
97. 389 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D.N.Y.),  aff'd,  516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975). 
98. Id. 
99. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); 
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). Judge Mansfield 
decided Kleindienst and Judge Feinberg decided Mitchell. 
100. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
101. Id. at  828-36. 
102. 389 F. Supp. at 1176-76. 
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Although NEPA expressly applies to "all agencies of the Federal 
G ~ v e r n m e n t , " ' ~ h a n y  agencies have resisted embracing the 
Congressional mandate.lo4 The Postal Service raised the unique 
objection that the Postal Reorganization Actlo%xempted the Serv- 
ice from the environmental mandate, but the court ruled that 
"[tlhere is nothing in the language of § 410 on its face which 
prohibits or makes impossible application of such a broad expres- 
sion of overriding national policy as NEPA."lo6 In addition, the court 
noted the Service's failure to examine all alternatives to the VMF 
as NEPA requires. In addition, there was insufficient study of the 
VMF's impact on the neighborhood and on the proposed apartment 
complex to be built above the facility.Io7 
Finally, the court took a telling look a t  what may be viewed as a 
beginning of "urban sociological law."'" In its final analysis of the 
procedural inadequacy of the EIS the court noted:Io9 
[Nlowhere does the EIS give meaningful consideration to the problems 
posed by such high density dwellings, containing large open space, com- 
pletely isolated from the surrounding environment. These are problems 
which will affect both the project residents and the Chelsea neighborhood in 
general. For example, crime and crime control are problems which have an 
environmental impact which must be considered in detail. 
The procedural inadequacies of the Postal Service EIS were suffi- 
cient to justify a preliminary injunction barring construction con- 
tracts for the VMF. The circuit court's affirmance agreed that "the 
Service has failed to meet the requirements of NEPA in making 'a 
careful and informed decisi~n.'""~ Among the deficiencies of the 
Postal Service EIS, the court of appeals cited and described the 
103. National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 4332(2) (1970). 
104. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Some agencies still resist. See, e.g., Robinson, 
Extraterritorial Environmental Botection Obligation of the Foreign Affairs Agencies: The 
Unfulfilled Mandate of NEPA, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT. L. & POLITICS 257 (1974). 
105. According to the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. 5 410(a) (19701, federal laws 
and regulations, with a few specific exceptions, do not apply to the Postal Service. NEPA is 
not one of the federal laws t ha t  specifically applies to the Postal Service. 39 U.S.C. 5 
IlO(b)(Supp. 1974). 
106. 389 F. Supp. a t  1179. 
107. Id. a t  1180-81. 
108. Letter from Albert K.  Butzel of Butzel & Kass (attorneys for the plaintiffs) to 
Nicholas A. Robinson, March 4, 1975. 
109. 389 F. Supp. a t  1184 (citations omitted). 
110. 516 F.2d a t  389. 
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sociological issue: "We do not know whether informed social scien- 
tists would conclude that the top of the VMF would likely become 
a human jungle, unsafe at  night and unappealing during the day.""' 
B. Westchester County Courthouse 
Similar urban social issues came into play in the lengthy and 
considered opinion which enjoined destruction of the six-building 
complex constituting the Westchester County C o u r t h ~ u s e . ~ ' ~  The
Courthouse was scheduled for demolition in the urban renewal of 
downtown White Plains, but subsequently was included in the Na- 
tional Register of Historic Places under the National Historic Pres- 
ervation Act (NHPA).lI3 Before federal funds are used in a project 
which affects an historic site listed in the National Register, NHPA 
requires that the federal agency afford the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation opportunity "to ~ornrnent ."~ '~  When read with 
NEPA, the duties of HUD were broadly construed. HUD's failure 
to review whether demolition of the courthouse was a majorfederal 
action significantly affecting the environment, was held to be "both 
substantively and procedurally defective under NEPA."I1" 
The district court closely adhered both to NEPA's requirements 
and the Hanly decision, and left the scope of what remained to be 
examined broad. While the range of interdisciplinary factors HUD 
will explore cannot be predicted, i t  is certain that some evaluation 
will be required where none was proffered before. 
C. Trinity Case 
The broader scope of NEPA relief was further emphasized in 
recent rulings in Manhattan's urban renewal area. Trinity Episco- 
pal School Corp. u. Romney1l6 has significance in the development 
of urban applications of environmental law, and as a probing of the 
reach of other duties under the National Environmental Protection 
Act. The plaintiffs in the Trinity case included a non-sectarian 
111. Id. a t  388. 
112. Save The Court House v. Lynn, No. 75-6005 (2d Cir. April 30, 1975). 
113. 16 U.S.C. 4 470 (1970). 
114. 16 U.S.C. 4 470(f) (1970). Exec. Order No. 11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971) requires 
adherence to these provisions. 
115. No. 75-6005, a t  50. 
116. 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975), remanding 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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private school, a committee of neighborhood residents, and 
individuals from the upper west side of Manhattan. They claimed, 
inter alia, that the West Side Urban Renewal Plan was modified 
without compliance with NEPA. The Plan and its impact are exten- 
sively set forth in the district court opinion."' 
Trinity School had agreed to sponsor a site next to its facilities 
(Site 30) on the understanding that the Plan would include a t  most 
some 2,500 low-income housing units and that in middle-income 
buildings the units would be allocated thirty percent to low-income 
tenants and seventy percent to middle-income tenants. The suit was 
precipitated by a redesignation of Site 30 from middle to low- 
income housing. Plaintiffs claimed that the redesignation would 
cause the area to deteriorate from the projected mixed middle-class 
neighborhood to a ghetto. Relying on Otero IJ. New York City Hous- 
ing Authority,lIR they contended that the change in Site 30 would 
mean that the area would "tip" from a middle to a low-income area, 
lose racial and economic integration, and produce an increase in 
crime, noise, and other anti-social activity."'' 
The district court concluded that the evidence as to tipping was 
too imprecise to permit a finding that the changes in the Plan would 
tip the neighborhood. I t  reviewed the evidence in terms of (1) gross 
numbers of minority or low-income families, (2) quality of com- 
munity services, and (3) attitudes of majority group families as to 
whether they would leave the area.I2O Despite 25 trial days and ex- 
tensive factual and expert testimony the district court concluded 
that "no meaningful proof exists in the trial record that the presence 
of that class [low income residents] is per se a cause of neighbor- 
hood deteri~ration."'~' This finding was buttressed by two HUD 
studies showing that the change in Site 30 would not have a signifi- 
cant adverse impact on the env i r~nmen t . ' ~~  
The district court expressly found that "[C]ommunity attitudes 
and fears, or the prospensity of certain economic or racial groups to 
commit anti-social behavior, do not lend themselves to . . . objec- 
pp - - - -- 
117. 387 F. Supp. at 1048-53. 
118. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). 
119. 387 F. Supp. at 1064-65. 
120. Id .  at  1065. 
121. Id .  at  1073. 
122. Id.  at  1073-75. 
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tive analysis and are not required in a NEPA Moreover, 
it ruled that )IUD's Special Environmental ClearancelZ4 which con- 
cluded that the project would not have a significant adverse impact 
on the environment had satisfied the mandate of NEPA as well as 
HUD's guidelines. lZ5 
The Second Circuit refused to hold that the district court's con- 
clusions of fact were clearly erroneous,126 but the plaintiffs did suc- 
cessfully contend that, as a matter of law, HUD's conduct did not 
satisfy NEPA. The court of appeals held that NEPA (1) required 
HUD to make its own independent review of alternatives and not 
merely accept City Housing Authority conclusions, and (2) man- 
dated a full review of alternatives irrespective of the obligation of 
filing an EIS. 
In outlining the urban factors which must be examined with re- 
spect to a project such as the Site 30 apartments, the court included 
"site selection and design; density; displacement and relocation; 
impact of the environment on current residents and their activities; 
- 
decay and blight; implications for the city growth policy; traffic and 
parking; noise; neighborhood stability; and the existence of services 
and commercial enterprises to service the new residents."lZ7 
Against such factual review, the court stated that HUD must 
study: lZ8 
alternative locations or sites; alternative of not building; alternative designs 
both in use of site and in size of individual units and number of total units; 
dispersal of the low income units or more sites in the project area; alternative 
measures for compensating or mitigating environmental impacts; and alter- 
natives requiring action of a significantly different nature which would pro- 
vide similar benefits with different impacts such as rehabilitation of existing 
buildings in the area as public housing projects. 
Moreover, the court ruled that  "[tlhe statement of possible 
alternatives, the consequences thereof and the facts and reasons for 
and against is HUD's task."'29 
123. Id. at  1078-79. 
124. This is required for apartment projects with 100 or more units (Site 30 had 160 
units) under HUD Circular 1385.1, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,673 (1972). 
125. 387 F. Supp. a t  1081-82. 
126. 523 F.2d at  92. 
127. Id. at 93. 
128. Id. at 94. 
129. Id. 
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The circuit court did not directly decide whether community atti- 
tudes and fears are a proper subject for a NEPA study. It did specu- 
late, however, that testimony by area witnesses on crime, drugs, 
vandalism, and other evidence of anti-social behaviorI3" "might well 
influence the appropriate housing agency to endeavor to minimize 
these dangers in its 'alternative'  recommendation^."'^ Thus it 
appears that subjective factors relevant to "tipping" may also be 
considered in connection with the wide range of alternatives which 
must be studied. 
What remains to be seen is how an interdisciplinary approach will 
be used to study alternatives. The circuit court remanded the case 
to the district court to require a study by the appropriate agencies 
of possible "alternatives" regarding the proposed change in Site 
30.'32 Critique of how such a study is to be accomplished necessarily 
will involve whether HUD has satisfied section 102(2)(a) (obliging 
it to utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach) as well as 
section 102(2)(D) (which mandates developing alternatives). As the 
foregoing suggests, this may be a far more sophisticated undertaking 
than the house of detention review in the Hanly cases p r e ~ e n t e d . ' ~ ~  
Like the Chelsea case, consideration of subjective factors may re- 
quire the expertise of sociologists, as well as anthropologists and 
psychologists. 
It is this aspect of the ruling which gives it precedential import- 
ance. Moreover, as New York State moves to implement its State 
Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA),'34 and other states 
apply their "little NEPA's," this NEPA construction may well be 
carried over to SEQRA, and all city and state agencies may find 
themselves engaged in the urban sociological examinations presaged 
in the Chelsea case and the Trinity ruling. 
V. Procedural Problems: Ripeness 
Just as a court's narrow interpretation of "standing" recently 
barred citizens from contesting excessive subway n~ise , '~%o a nig- 
-- 
130. 387 F. Supp. at 1069. 
131. 523 F.2d at 95. 
132. Id. 
133. See text accompanying notes 103-104 supra. 
134. Act of Aug. 1, 1975, N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 612 (McKinney's 1975). 
135. Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth., 48 App. Div. 2d 69, 368 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st 
Dep't 1975). 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  4  Fordham Urb. L.J. 488 1975-1976 
19761 URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LA W 489 
gardly view as to when an issue is ready for judicial review can stall 
vindication of public rights. The question of the point a t  which a 
party threatened with environmental injury may seek redress in the 
courts was highlighted in 1974 by two New York County Supreme 
Court rulings involving the proposed West Side Manhattan conven- 
tion center of the New York City Convention and Exhibition Corpo- 
ration (Corporation). 
In Gottfried v. New York City Convention and Exhibition Center 
C~rpo ra t i on '~~  Judge Greenfield denied petitions under Article 78 
of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) which alleged, 
inter alia, that the Corporation's Development Plan for the conven- 
tion center failed to conform to New York City's "comprehensive" 
plan and failed to examine the adverse public health effects and 
other environmental impact generated by the center. The City Plan- 
ning Commission and the Board of Estimate, in approving the De- 
velopment Plan, had made specific findings that it was in conform- 
ity with the comprehensive plan for the municipality as a whole.IJ7 
However, petitioners claimed that such a finding could not have 
been made because no environmental impact studies had been un- 
dertaken or completed prior to presenting the Plan to them for 
approval. Nevertheless the court decided that the future impact was 
difficult to anticipate, and that studies being done as the project 
was developed was sufficient to comply with the provisions in the 
The Gottfried special proceeding was brought by a state Assem- 
blyman for the Assembly District in which the proposed convention 
center site is located, by four residents of the neighborhood, and the 
New York Coliseum Exhibition Corporation, a potential competitor 
of the respondent corporation. 
A separate Article 78 Proceeding was commenced by a citizens' 
organization, the Coalition for Clean Air by 1975. Justice Greenfield 
1 
136. Gottfried v. New York City Convention and Exhibition Center Corp., Index No. 
13,184173 (N.Y. County, Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 1974). 
137. The corporation is created and governed by Act of July 2, 1971, ch. 1011, [I9711 N.Y. 
Laws 1691, as amended, Act of July 2, 1971, ch. 1009-10, [I9711 N.Y. Laws 1689; Act of June 
8, 1972, ch. 926, [I9721 N.Y. Laws 3753. Sections 6(1), 6(2),  and 6(4) of this act require in 
relevant part that the Corporation's Development Plan must conform to "a comprehensive 
plan for the development of the municipality as  a whole." 
138. Index No. 13,1841'73, at  23. 
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also denied this petition to enjoin the project.lgg Petitioners had 
urged that (1) the Corporation was proceeding to construction with- 
out a permit, (2) the New York State Commissioner of Environmen- 
tal Conservation had failed to halt construction and, (3) increased 
traffic would pollute the air thus impairing public health.1J0 
The court ruled that the Coalition's petition was "premature and 
legally insufficient."14' No construction had begun. No permits were 
needed. No injury was present or immediately forseeable. The court 
declined to enjoin any party on the basis of the charge of "anticipa- 
tory violation of the law."142 
Several important environmental quality issues were raised by 
these suits. The first was the air quality deterioration. The second 
was whether all aspects of neighborhood protection had been consid- 
ered and whether the center conformed to the city's zoning and 
comprehensive ~ 1 a n n i n g . I ~ ~  
Although the corporation was not required in haec verba to do an 
environmental impact analysis for the center, it was obliged by law 
to evaluate the "relationship between the [center's] development 
plan and a comprehensive plan for the development of the munici- 
pality as a whole."144 In turn, the City Planning Commission was to 
"certify . . . whether the development plan . . . conforms to a com- 
prehensive and then the Board of Estimate was by resolu- 
tion to decide whether "the development plan conforms to a com- 
prehensive plan."'46 
The petitioners claimed that air pollution, traffic and neighbor- 
hood impact should have been reviewed as part of the required 
conformity with the comprehensive plan. The Corporation main- 
tained that all these environmental evaluations could be done after 
its development plan was approved.147 
Judge Greenfield reconciled these positions as follows:'4R 
139. Coalition for Clean Air by 1975 v .  New York City Convention and Exhibition Center 




143. See note 137 supra and accompanying text. 
144. Act of July 2, 1971, ch. 1011, [I9711 N.Y. Laws 1691. 
145. Id. 8 6(2). 
146. Id. 8 6(4). 
147. 172 N.Y.L.J. at 17. 
148. Id. 
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I t  is difficult to  comprehend how there can be definitive statements a s  t o  the  
total environmental impact of a future project when so many variables and  
contingencies can alter the outlook. 
The court deferred to the expertise of the Planning Commission 
which found that the Corporation's development plan conformed to 
a comprehensive city plan. It did so apparently in the face of "con- 
flicting factual claims," and a record revealing that the only envi- 
ronmental study was a twenty-two page statement entitled 
"Preliminary Statement of Environmental Effects."14g 
Put bluntly, the court acknowledged that petitioners had shown 
that no serious environmental protection studies had been under- 
taken prior to asking city approval of a major convention center and 
plan which included a city capital budget authorization of fifty 
million dollars to begin construction of the center. Nonetheless, the 
court told the petitioners, that it was not yet timely to raise these 
environmental issues.'50 
The ripeness issue is one which has been litigated in federal court 
environmental cases. These rulings can offer some guidance in the 
Convention Center context. Where a statute clearly evidences a 
legislative policy of "ecology preservation," a court is reluctant to 
find laches.I5' In the "comprehensive plan" for the development 
of the municipality, environmental issues increasingly are held rele- 
 ant.'^^ Nonetheless, as Judge Greenfield's ruling reveals, the man- 
date to include environmental protection in such a comprehensive 
plan is less than uniformly admitted. Thus, failure to seek judicial 
review a t  this juncture raises the possibility of a finding of laches 
a t  a later date.153 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975); Arlington Coalition on Transp. 
v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
152. See generally, Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 324 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. -Ct. 1971), 
off 'd ,  40 App. Div. 2d 535, 334 N.Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dep't 1972), aff 'd mem., 32 N.Y.2d 681, 
296 N.E.2d 256, 343 N . Y . S . ~ ~  360 (1970) (local zoning drdinance was required to take into 
consideration ecological problems such as effect of change of zoning on local water supply and 
sewage disposal facilities). Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 
(1968), deals more with land use and not quite as clearly with environmental problems. 
153. Respondents argued that by seeking a stay on September 5, 1973 when petitioners 
commenced the proceedings the passage of time alone subjected them to charges of laches. 
Memorandum for Respondents at  15-17, Gottfried v. New York City Convention and Exhibi- 
tion Corp., Index No. 13,184173 (N.Y. County, Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 1974). 
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In declining to stay the center operations, or to fashion sua sponte 
an intermediate remedy compelling environmental studies in 
connection with the comprehensive plan, the court ruled that the 
relief was sought too early, and dismissed the petitions. In a compa- 
rable NEPA case, Silva u. Romney,'" the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed that the district court had the power to enjoin HUD 
from approving a $4 million mortgage guarantee and $156,000 inter- 
est grant pending preparation of an environmental impact state- 
ment. In the case of federal highway construction, the mere acquisi- 
tion by a state government of land for a federal highway route re- 
quired environmental impact analysis under NEPA because it 
"would make proceeding with the proposed route increasingly easier 
and, therefore, a decision to alter or abandon the route increasingly 
unde~ i r ab l e . "~~~  
In a close analysis of NEPA review, one commentator argues that 
"[tlhe virtual inevitability of federal involvement, coupled with 
NEPA's clear command to include environmental considerations in 
the earliest planning of federally supported projects, especially be- 
fore alternative sitings and possible palliative actions are fore- 
closed," suggests early review.'" In the Gottfried case, where an 
Army Corps of Engineers' permit must be obtained, a federal suit 
to compel a NEPA review might have been timely under federal law 
even while Judge Greenfield was rejecting the claim of a state or city 
responsibility under state law. The reluctance of the Gottfried court 
to read strong environmental requirements into the City compre- 
hensive plan illustrates the uncertainty for both conservationist and 
developer in dealing with environmental laws. Arguably, until the 
forthcoming NEPA review is completed for federal permits, no ex- 
tensive or irreversible activity should be encouraged. The court's 
reading of the corporation's authorization laws is a t  odds with an 
integrated environmental approach to projects like the Center. As 
with the New York Telephone case, where state laws can be 
construed to facilitate a socially desirable end, they should be so 
construed. 
154. 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973). 
155. Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S.  1000 (1972). For a highway ruling in an urban context, see La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 
337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971). 
156. R. ANDERSON. EPA IN THE COURTS 69 (1969). 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  4  Fordham Urb. L.J. 492 1975-1976 
19761 URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 493 
VI. Conclusion 
The deterioration of our cities has engendered among the citizens 
a sense that they themselves must act to protect the aesthetics, 
health and safety of their habitat. New legislation affords compre- 
hensive new rights to citizens when the appropriate administrative 
agencies fail to maintain or restore an urban environmental amen- 
ity. 
The channel into which citizen enforcement action proceeds is the 
court system. Traditional administrative law challenges, such as in 
Spatt, will doubtless be given a careful and considered reception. 
Invocation of the newer environmental criteria may find tougher 
sledding. The courts are unfamiliar and unsure of relating these new 
rights to older and more traditional standards. The New York 
Telephone and Gottfried decisions are illustrative of such judicial 
reluctance and uncertainty. 
Where specific newer standards may prove difficult for courts to 
apply, the more comprehensive instruction of NEPA is more easily 
grasped. A court can order a comprehensive analysis of urban envi- 
ronmental impact more easily than it can weigh the validity of 
ultimate decision. Citizens are in a good position to assail incom- 
plete NEPA studies because of their own familiarity with local 
urban conditions. NEPA cases also serve to cut through the sectoral 
isolation of noise, water, air and preservation laws, and to integrate 
sympathetically the goals of different environmental statutes. 
Environmental law has become an "urban" law field, both in 
terms of statutory development and case law. Citizen awareness of 
the right to enforce environmental law protections has grown sub- 
stantially in recent years. "Citizen groups are not to be treated as 
nuisances or trouble makers but rather as welcomed participants in 
the vindication of environmental intere~ts."'~' Through the evolu- 
tion of such activism, urban centers in the United States may well 
be moving toward establishing the sound environment which has so 
often eluded us in the past. 
157. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, No. 75-7497, a t  3424 (2d Cir. April 26, 1976). In an 
appeal arising out of a denial of an action brought by a citizen's group to enforce implementa- 
tion of the Transportation Control Plan for the Metropolitan New York City Area (the 
"Plan"), the Second Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case, directing 
enforcement of the "Plan's" several strategies to abate air pollution. The court noted the 
validity of citizen suits in the environmental area, and said that ' the record before them 
"crie[dl out for prompt and effective relief if the congressional clean air mandate is to have 
any meaning and effect in New York City." Id. a t  3440. 
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